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Abstract 
In 1997 Local Government Studies published an article (Asquith, 1997) which assessed the 
perceptions of managerial and political elites in eight English local authorities towards change 
management against the background of Conservative Governments' reform agendas. The article 
argued that the authorities could be placed on a continuum depending on their state of organisational 
evolution, with some authorities being better equipped to manage change than others. During 2005 
the authorities were revisited to ascertain how they had adapted to deal with the reforming Blair 
Governments since 1997. What this article shows is that characteristics evidenced in the original work 
in the authority deemed to have evolved the most, were present in those authorities revisited. 
 
Introduction 
This paper revisits work undertaken in the 1990s which examined the role of eight English local 
authority chief executives in implementing and managing change, within the constraints imposed by 
internal managerial and organisational politics and the broader political environment. Extensive 
interviews were conducted with managerial and political elites to ascertain the nature of change 
management in the early 1990s. The findings were reported in Local Government Studies (Asquith, 
1997), along with the results of an extensive employee attitudes survey in the eight authorities 
conducted at the same time (Asquith, 1998). Further, the article adds to the growing body of 
knowledge relating to the changing role of local authority chief executives (c.f. Dahler-Larsen, 2002; 
Morphett, 1990; Morphett, 1993; Morris and Paine, 1995; Mouritzen and Svara, 2002; Norton, 1991; 
Skelcher, 2010a; Skelcher, 2010b). 
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Given that the reforming Labour Governments of Tony Blair had a keen interest in the activities of 
local government, not least to ensure key policies on primary and secondary education − which are the 
responsibility of local government − are delivered, it seemed timely in 2005 to revisit the authorities in 
the original research to ascertain the state of play after eight years of new Labour reform. Access was 
therefore sought to the chief executive within the original sample organisations. Six out of the sample 
agreed to facilitate a meeting. The local authorities can be characterised thus: 
 A radical reforming London borough (L1) very much at the forefront of New Labour thinking. 
One of the first to adopt the 'Directly Elected Mayor' model. The move to the Mayoral model 
was seen as a continuation of the innovative approach to organisation, management and service 
delivery evident during the original fieldwork in 1991. The chief executive here had been a 
chief officer within the authority at the time of the original research and was the second-longest 
serving chief executive in London. Hence the authority had experienced managerial continuity. 
 A London borough (L2) seen by many as the ‘model’ advocated by successive Conservative 
ministers. At the time of the original research it had been engulfed in both managerial and 
political leadership crises. Despite a change of Government, the authority still saw itself as 
being at the cutting edge of developments in local government and had recently been awarded 
the title of ‘Council of the Year’ by its peers. Access in 2005 was provided to the Director of 
Policy who had held a less senior role in the organisation in the early 1990s. 
 A northern metropolitan authority (M1) which in the intervening period between the time of the 
original work and 2005 had undergone a number of internal organisational crises. The chief 
executive in 2005 had held a chief officer post in the organisation during the original research. 
 A shire county (S1) in the midlands which in the early 1990s had to deal with the resignation of 
a reforming chief executive in disgrace and the imprisonment of a reforming Leader of the 
Council. In the intervening period the authority had lost a significant area of land and population 
during local government reorganisation. The chief executive in 2005 had served as a chief 
officer with the authority prior to her appointment, and before that had been a chief officer in 
the northern metropolitan authority (M1). 
 A small shire district (D1) within the county (S1) (above). This chief executive had remained in 
post throughout the time period. At the time of the original research this authority was unusual 
in that all of its councillors were elected as ‘Independents’ and it contained no party ‘Political’ 
members. 
 A south coast city (D2) which at the time of the original work had had a chief executive who 
was unsuccessfully attempting a major change programme. The intervening period had seen a 
new chief executive who had dealt with the authority gaining unitary status by simply ‘bolting’ 
on the newly acquired functions. In 2004 the authority had appointed a chief executive with a 
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distinct remit to radically transform the organisation in order to equip it with the organisational 
capabilities required to meet the challenges posed by the Blairite reform agenda. Less than a 
year later, this chief executive departed the authority after the refusal of elected members to 
accept and endorse the radical change agenda advocated. 
In addition to these six organisations, the two others where access was sought but denied were: 
 A northern metropolitan borough (M2) which following the change in political administration in 
2004 had parted company with the chief executive. The interim/acting chief executive felt 
unable to participate in the research. 
 A midlands shire county (S2) where the chief executive who had been in post since the time of 
the original research was approaching retirement, and declined to participate in the research. 
The original research placed the eight authorities in a typology which categorised the organisations 
according to a number of common characteristics. The placement of each local authority was the result 
of circa 100 interviews with chief executives, chief officers and leading elected members in all eight 
authorities. The authorities were placed in the typology as they exhibited mostly features of that type: 
 Transactional – Introverted bureaucratic organisations which lacked chief executive leadership, 
with power revolving around traditional chief officer/committee chair/councillor relationships. 
 Community Leadership – Unified managerial/political focus on community, yet hindered by 
insular corporate management style. 
 Business Culture – Low appreciation of community, highly commercialised/managerial focus – 
driven solely by the provision of statutory obligations. 
 Entrepreneurial Citizenship – Combination of the managerial/political focus on community 
with a strong emphasis on commercial efficiency and effectiveness (see Table 1). 
    Table 1: Typology of authorities interviewed 
Authority type Transactional 
Community 
Leadership 
Business   
Culture 
Entrepreneurial Citizenship 
Managerial & 
political focus 
Internal –          
rule bound 
External – 
effectiveness 
Internal −  
efficiency 
External  − effectiveness 
Internal   − efficiency 
Managerial 
philosophy 
Bureaucratic/ 
Weberian 
Corporate 
Strategic 
(Commercial) 
Strategic  
(Governance) 
Perception of   
service users 
Recipients Citizens Customers Citizens 
Strategic actor 
support 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Street level    
support 
No No Yes Yes 
Authorities D2;  S1 D1;  M1 L2;  M2;  S2 L1 
   Source: Adapted from Asquith (1997) and (1998) 
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It was previously argued (Asquith 1997) that the types represented a continuum, with each of the 
stages being evolutions on the preceding stage, moving left to right. Hence, the Entrepreneurial 
Citizenship classification, it was argued, was the most advanced organisational type, with one 
authority, L1, actively seeking to demonstrate those characteristics – having previously been classified 
as being a Community Leadership authority.  
There appears to be striking similarity in the characteristics between the Entrepreneurial Citizenship 
authorities and the model local authority espoused in the raft of legislation concerning local 
government passed by the Blair administration, a model described as Enlightened Public Governance 
(Thynne, 2003) or New Public Governance (Osbourne, 2006; 2010). Hence, common themes existed 
around issues of: internal efficiency; external effectiveness and community engagement. These themes 
exhibited themselves in two primary policy thrusts post 1997, namely: democratic renewal and the 
shift from local government to local governance. The latter is the realisation that a local authority has a 
legitimate right to lead its community, yet cannot alone achieve all the objectives it aspires to – it must 
act in partnership with other public sector bodies, the private sector and the not-for-profit sector. 
New Labour: new local government? 
The most striking thing about the interviews conducted in 2005 was the general, if somewhat 
reluctant, agreement about the way in which local government was viewed by central government. 
Whilst no one signed up to the New Labour agenda without some kind of reservation, there was at 
least a grudging respect for what the post 1997 reforms had offered local government. This can be 
contrasted to the so-called ‘dark’ days of the 1980’s and early 1990s when Davis (1988) argued that 
local government was ‘under siege’. Indeed, analysis of the interview transcripts from the early 1990s 
shows the dominance within local government of two key issues. These were: the Community Charge 
or Poll Tax – a single charged imposed upon all adults within a local authorities area, and Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering – the compulsory use of market forces in the provision of some local 
government functions.. One of the 2005 interviewees commented that the combination of the Poll Tax 
and Compulsory Competitive Tendering had in effect placed local government managers in the role of 
service reducers. As one chief executive observed: 
Well I have to say for both in my perspective here, in general it has been very positive because the 
amount of money that is coming to public service and the environment that I have worked in as a senior 
manager has been one way you have been able to develop service since 1997, whereas up to 1997 all we 
did was reduce service 
In contrast, the situation in 2005 meant that they were able to think and plan strategically to develop 
and deliver services for the community. Despite this however, fears still exist as to the extent to which 
local government was being ‘neutered’ and ‘nationalised’ through the continued retention and use of 
instruments such as Council Tax capping – whereby the maximum level of taxation raised by a local 
authority is set centrally by national government – thereby fundamentally undermining a key principle 
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of local democracy. Indeed one chief executive suggested that if the centralisation trend continued he 
would cease to be an employee of the local authority and be on the payroll of Her Majesty’s 
Government, observing on the cumulative effect of the New Labour reforms thus: 
I think services to the public are better, local government is weaker… the role of the managerial 
leader in local government has been elevated… Local political enterprise is being devalued and 
managerial enterprise has been revalued. Government has increasingly declined to talk to local 
political leaders but will talk to local managerial leaders. 
Interesting, this theme is further articulated by Skelcher when he comments that after 12 years of 
Labour Administrations has resulted in: 
Its overall impact on officer-member relationships has been to strengthen the role of the former, at 
the expense of the latter… (2010b: 336) 
It was clear from the 2005 interviewees that there existed a view that central government did not quite 
grasp the diversity inherent within local government, and the stark differences which exist between 
city or urban local government and managing in a rural local authority. There was a clear undercurrent 
which suggested that the post 1997 reform agenda – in particular towards local authority internal 
management arrangements (see below) − had been dominated by organisations such as the New Local 
Government Network, a Blairite local government think tank, whose leading actors come from 
principally urban local authorities. Hence, it was suggested that central government was to some 
extent pursuing a ‘one size fits all’, standardising agenda which was clearly inappropriate to many 
rural local authorities.  
The one policy which was specifically identified for criticism here was the Democratically Elected 
Mayor model of internal organisation, the pursuit of which, it was argued, was the result of the then 
Prime Minister’s interest in American models of management. Whilst this mode of organisation may 
be deemed to be appropriate for urban authorities, it was argued that in thinly populated rural 
authorities there was little interest in the 'Directly Elected Mayor' model. As the chief executive of S1 
wryly commented: 
Blair has, his obsession with choice and privatisation and American way of doing things are very 
very urban models which just do not fit into a rural environment… 
There is no way you will ever get people of S1 shire saying ‘we want an elected Mayor because 
people who live in Town A have one. They wouldn’t have a bloody clue who the elected Mayor 
from Town A was, because it is nearly 80 miles away in the car. I do think the Labour Government 
has been incredibly urban centric. 
Elsewhere within the urban authorities, L2 and M1, support for the 'Directly Elected Mayor' was not 
strong. The perceived concentration of power in one individual was seen as being detrimental to the 
nature of local democracy whereby a council took decisions as a whole. It is the view of the writer 
however, that the managerial and political instability which was evidenced in both L2 and M1 during 
the period 1990-2005 – in contrast to the marked stability in L1 – has resulted in organisations lacking 
both the maturity and confidence needed to successfully operationalise the 'Directly Elected Mayor' 
model to the maximum benefit of the locality. 
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An interesting aside to the whole New Labour agenda arose around the views expressed towards the 
idea of individual choice being advanced by Le Grand (2002) amongst others. Indeed those 
interviewed were very vocal on this issue, taking the government to task over the language chosen to 
describe the individual – citizen, service user, consumer or customer, as being generally irrelevant. 
The general consensus was that the title did not matter – least of all to service recipients, just as long 
as they benefited from timely, effective services which were appropriate to their individual needs. 
What did cause considerable consternation was the pursuit of choice by central government. It was 
consistently argued that as long as service recipients benefited from the timely effective services noted 
above, then choice was an irrelevancy. Further, it was argued that in an urban area, where service 
providers may be numerous, such as schools, within a large rural county where schools may be over 
20 miles apart, the idea of choice was a misnomer. This debate was summarised effectively by one 
interviewee thus: 
I don’t get too carried away with citizen or customer or resident or whatever. The principle is that 
you treat them as king and how you respond with the service, rather than you have this structure 
and service in place and it is up to you guys to find the best way in. 
The general tone of New Labour’s approach to local government was set out in a raft of consultation 
documents published in 1998 by the then Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
and which evolved into the White Paper, Modern Local Government In Touch with the People (DETR, 
1998), which in turn became the Local Government Act 2000. These consultation documents dealt 
with a range of issues affecting local government. A review of the literature generated by the Blair 
agenda vis a vis local government demonstrates a three-pronged approach based around the internal 
management arrangements of local authorities; enhancing performance management regimes and the 
wider issue of local governance not government (Hartley et al, 2002; Newman et al, 2001, Painter et 
al 2003; Wilson, 2005; Wilson and Doig, 2000).   
There was a general agreement amongst those interviewed in 2005 that the New Labour agenda had 
had a generally positive impact upon local government in England. What is interesting is that both 
London Boroughs felt that they had been instrumental in setting this agenda in terms of governance 
and efficiency – despite consistently representing very different party political positions. 
Internal organisational dynamics 
By far the most important changes here relate to the reforms introduced by the Local Government Act 
2000 (Rao, 2003). These reforms offered all local authorities over the size of 85,000 in population the 
choice of one of three systems of political organisation: 
 Leader with a Cabinet – whereby the leader of the largest political grouping on a council 
would form a cabinet of portfolio holders. This model was seen as the one involving the least 
change, and was adopted by over 90% of all local authorities. 
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 Directly Elected Mayor with a Cabinet – whereby a popularly elected mayor would select a 
cabinet from elected councillors. This was the model advocated by Blair Government. However 
it was only adopted by 13 local authorities in total, being later abandoned in two of these. 
 Directly Elected Mayor with a Manager – the most radical model, envisaging the role mayor 
as akin to that of a private sector style chairperson, with the city manager fulfilling the chief 
executive role. This option was abolished in 2007. 
Within the eight sample authorities, seven had chosen the Leader with a Cabinet option – in line with 
over 97% of all local authorities. One of the London Boroughs (L1) had however sought the more 
radical option of the Mayor with a Cabinet. In fact, before the legislation was in place, the Council had 
delegated authority to an Executive Committee led by an appointed Mayor with executive power 
(Asquith, 2008). 
Of those authorities that had adopted the Leader with a Cabinet model, the differing rationales offered 
stark contrasts. In L2 which had been characterised by one of its’ chief officers as being more like a 
‘Hanson than a Marks and Spencer’ (Asquith, 1997), in that it had no all-embracing corporate culture, 
such as Marks and Spencer, rather it functioned as a number of loosely associated departmental 
cultures, similar to that in a holding company such as Hanson plc., with each department driven by 
dominant committee chair/chief officer relationship. However in 2005, it was argued that such 
relationships operated successfully within the 'Leader with a Cabinet' model, which had been 
enthusiastically embraced as a mechanism to ensure that strategic governance was maintained, with 
the reforms providing a ‘corporate glue’, and that the collective nature of Cabinet government would 
serve to prevent aberrant leadership episodes such as that affecting L2 during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Here, it is interesting to note that the chief executive of L1 argued that the 'Leader with a Cabinet' 
model had the potential to create Cabinet fiefdoms similar to those evidenced during times of crises 
within L2 – and as such presented the potential to legitimise the departmentalism exhibited previously 
in L2 and elsewhere. Indeed, such dangers were also voiced in D2, where the chief executive had 
purposefully created a management structure which did not mirror roles and responsibilities of Cabinet 
portfolio holders, attempting to prevent the re-creation of fiefdoms previously evident in the authority. 
A major criticism of the reform agenda was the fact that all the models offered differing degrees of 
power concentration at the expense of the wider group of elected members. In one of the London 
Boroughs this was specifically flagged up as being an issue. Certainly in the past the authority had 
been used as a stepping stone to either national politics or prominence in local government circles. 
However, the feeling was that given the restriction of five to seven high profile positions within the 
organisation as Cabinet Members, this might restrict the flow of people of the right calibre seeking 
election to local government. What was not addressed, however, was the opportunity in the past for 
small number individuals to create semi-autonomous power baronies as the chair of a powerful 
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Council committee – something which had been prevalent in this particular authority. Away from 
London, it was interesting to note that interviewees reported both a drop in the average age of elected 
members and an increase in the calibre of elected councillors. As such it was argued that the quality of 
debate and ultimately the decision-making process had benefited from the post-2000 reforms. 
Elsewhere, in M1, prior to the Local Government Act 2000, the authority recorded over 80 internal 
decision making bodies, which ultimately led to corporate chaos. The restructuring of the decision-
making machinery to fit the 'Leader with a Cabinet' model provided the authority with political and 
managerial coherence and strategic direction. Elsewhere, it was argued that the concept of Cabinet 
responsibility had served to undermine previously strong committee chair/chief officer relationships 
which had effectively derailed attempts to manage the authority strategically. 
The issue of power concentration noted above was not felt to be a cause of concern in L1 where the 
'Directly Elected Mayor with a Cabinet' model had been adopted. It was argued that such a model had 
had a positive impact upon local democratic accountability. The operationalisation of the model in L1 
resulted in there being a single, easily identifiable person directly accountable to the populace. 
However, any power that person had was constrained by both the Cabinet and, of key importance, by 
internal organisational and party political conventions. Certainly it was argued that given the role the 
Directly Elected Mayor has pursued, the net impact has been a marked upturn in both interest and 
involvement in local democracy in the borough, with for the first time, citizens knowing exactly where 
the buck stops – with one identifiable individual rather than a bureaucratic machine:  
I would say also that in the last few years, they take more people back to the councils because they 
know he is making the decision, they know he is the mayor and so the rule form is that the mayor 
makes the decision in the presence of officers who are advising him on professional grounds and 
his cabinet who are advising him about the politics of the issue which is very different from 
virtually every other councils, where the decision is made in the committee or in some 
circumstances is delegated to any one person, the mayor or chief officer, so we are very very 
corporate…(we are) probably more corporate than perhaps some of the mayoral councils would 
be like us ….we are more corporate than anyone you’d find. 
The local election results of 2006 which saw the first re-election campaign in L1 of the Democratically 
Elected Mayor witnessed both an increased level of voter participation and an increased level of 
support for the incumbent. Interestingly, this pattern was also evident in all the Mayoral re-election 
contests held during May 2006. This pattern was again largely replicated in the subsequent round of 
Mayoral elections in 2010. The desire to see the 'Democratically Elected Mayoral' model work has led 
to further innovations in L1 which were designed to increase levels of participation in the democratic 
process amongst the population, away from traditional participatory activities of simply casting a vote 
every four years. The widespread use of Citizens’ Juries and the innovative introduction of a Young 
Persons Mayor have served to encourage additional inputs into the workings of the local authority 
from groups often seen as being socially excluded from the mainstream (Quirk, 2006). 
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The authority (L1) concerned has a history (of over 20 years) of stable political and managerial 
leadership with clearly understood political/managerial boundaries. In the early 1990s a number of 
senior officers (including the then chief executive and the assistant chief executive) had previously 
served elsewhere as elected members. During the fieldwork in 2005, it was suggested by the writer 
that this had been a significant factor in the political/managerial harmony within the organisation, in 
that senior managerial personnel were familiar with the pressures which characterise the world of the 
elected councillor. However, in 2005 the chief executive was adamant that this so-called ‘twin-
tracking’ had not been the primary cause of the political/managerial harmony – it may have helped, 
but was by no means the driver. However, it remains the view of the writer that given the internal 
managerial/political environment within L1, when compared to the other seven authorities in the 
sample, that this represented a positive example of the potential benefits twin tracking offered towards 
the strengthening of managerial and democratic understanding within local government. Given the 
experiences in L1, it may be timely to revisit or revise the Local Government and Housing Act (1989) 
which outlawed twin-tracking. 
The perceived success of the 'Directly Elected Mayor' model within L1 may also be attributed to other 
unique local factors. The Directly Elected Mayor had been one of two very high profile councillors 
who had dominated local politics since the mid-1980s. Indeed his profile was significantly enhanced 
locally by the television programme ‘Town Hall’ which chronicled the machinations within the 
authority for a 12 month period when he was Leader, and by a period when he ceased being a 
councillor, but undertook another high profile activity as chairman of the local hospital board. Hence, 
whilst not on the local authority, he held an equally high profile role in the local community. Such a 
high profile, the chief executive argued, aided the role he now undertakes as Directly Elected Mayor.  
The Mayoral election results of May 2006 added a new dimension to the equation. Whilst the Mayor 
secured re-election with an increased turnout and an increase in the number of votes received, the 
political party he represents lost control of the Council for the first time in over twenty years. 
Interestingly, the Mayor was re-elected again in 2010 with an increased vote and the political party he 
represents also regained control of the authority. One can speculate that the political party was a 
benefactor of the Mayor's profile. 
This ‘public presence’ was demonstrated, in a poll conducted by the borough in 2005, which showed 
that the Directly Elected Mayor enjoyed a higher recognition rating than any of the Members of 
Parliament who represent the borough – 31% compared to 29%. The chief executive attempted to put 
this in perspective when he noted the intensity of local politics in London, with 32 boroughs seeking 
the limelight, all of whom have to compete for publicity with the Mayor of London. This, the chief 
executive suggested, was significantly different from the situation in Middlesbrough or Bedford where 
the Directly Elected Mayor had little competition for the local media spotlight (Asquith, 2008). 
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Hence, in terms of internal authority organisation, the key reforms here have been around the political 
management structure. The century-old traditional committee structure had been abandoned, and in its 
place local authorities were offered three options for change, all of which were designed to modernise 
the decision making process. Whilst the majority of local authorities chose the option of least change, 
the Leader with a Cabinet model, one of the sample authorities had opted for the more radical choice 
of the Mayor with a Cabinet model.  
External organisational dynamics 
The external environment within which local authorities now exist has been dramatically transformed 
since 1997 – all in the name of effectiveness and community engagement – observations made not 
only by all those interviewed for this article and further explored by Skelcher (2010b) . A raft of new 
initiatives have been launched (and dropped), designed to have a positive impact upon the operation of 
local government – all of which it could be argued fall within the remit of so-called ‘Joined-Up-
Government’ (JUG). Whilst many of these new enterprises have met with differing success levels, 
they have not been without their detractors. Indeed Painter et al (2003) noted wryly that local 
government has a bad case of ’initative-itis’ caused by the stream of initiatives coming from various 
central government departments, with Stoker (2002) likening the situation to the national lottery. One 
chief executive commented: 
I think  that the drive to efficiency is over stretched, I think the degree of change and realignment and 
piloting things and then rolling them out before they have evaluated the pilot creates too much change 
and movement that can’t be embedded and are destabilizing ultimately even if the ultimate goals are 
meant to be laudable. 
One major note of warning was expressed by a chief executive who has direct experience of the 
machinery of both local and central government. He argued that an inherent danger of JUG was that 
rather than poorly performing services/organisations ‘upping’ their game to match the best performing 
partners, what could happen is an end result of mass mediocrity rather than public service excellence. 
Whilst there have been attempts to provide co-ordination to these processes under the JUG agenda, 
there is still consternation that central government does not quite understand how and why local 
government operates. Indeed, one 2005 interviewee suggested that in terms of the public sector 
efficiency drive − the so-called Gershon Agenda – central government had much to learn from local 
authorities who after years of voluntary and involuntary competition ran very tight, efficient 
organisations (Gershon, 2004; Quirk, 2005). Gershon sought to identify efficiencies across the public 
sector and to redirect savings towards front-line services. 
Further, it was suggested that for central government to pursue any form of JUG in relation to sub-
national government was a misnomer. Examples cited here related to the often conflicting agendas 
evident within local authority, police and health service organisations operating within one locality – 
with each service being accountable to different central government departments and being funded 
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separately. Indeed, one chief executive spoke of his frustration with such issues, and of how at a 
meeting with civil servants in London, he introduced two senior civil servants who had issued his 
authority contradictory directives – he told them to resolve the issue and let him know the outcome. 
One aspect of the JUG agenda which had been taken to heart was the idea of networking to achieve 
policy goals. Given the holistic view of local governance which now dominates, it was argued that 
without networking and partnership working, it would be impossible for local agencies to deliver 
desirable outcomes. Reasons for adopting such modes of operation differed from authority to 
authority. Within S1, it was argued that given the dispersal of a small population within a large 
geographic area, to expect one agency to deliver all services was nonsense, and that partnership 
operations were an operational necessity not a government fad.  Against this, it is important to note the 
observations of Painter et al (1997) that there was is a risk in partnership formation in that they can be 
time consuming, with the inherent danger that the wrong partnerships may be formed. Indeed, such an 
observation was made by one chief executive: 
Partnership working is another example, who would deny it is a good thing, but we have 
partnerships coming out of our ears, and if we stop talking about how these partnerships link, how 
they work and who is on then, and the agendas and everything, sometimes I think would be more 
effective, so I think the new agenda is flawed, shall I say. 
As such local authorities need a strategic view of their partnering activities, and of the associated 
transaction costs, described by Kumar and van Dissel thus: 
Transaction costs are the costs of managing the interaction while keeping the opportunistic 
behaviour under control so that on-going co-operation between the units can be sustained (1996: 
291) 
What was most striking about the adoption and use of partnerships was how they crossed the political 
divide. By far the two greatest advocates amongst the sample were the two London boroughs. In the 
Conservative led authority the rationale for entering into partnerships was far removed from the 
politically motivated ‘externalising’ mentality which prevailed during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Indeed, it was noted that services externalised during this period had in fact being brought back in 
house to facilitate more effective operations.  
The good governance requirement placed on local government since the implementation of the Local 
Government Act (2000) had made partnership creation a necessity. Here, of specific note was the 
strategic partnership in the field of information and communication technologies, where expertise and 
investment outstripped the resources available in-house to the organisation. Elsewhere, in L1 a radical 
reforming flagship London borough, the local authority had aggressively pursued a policy of focussing 
on strategic service delivery and improvement. This had been achieved via a policy of partnership and 
externalising functions where it did not possess the necessary skills and resources in-house.  Between 
1991 and 2005 the authority transferred over 5,000 of its workforce into partner organisations. 
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Hence, the partnership relationships were driven less by dogma and more by operational realities. 
Indeed another authority in the sample (S1) which in the early 1990s had been positively pursuing an 
agenda to externalise service delivery, was now seeking to use partnership arrangements in service 
areas as a means to regulate market mechanisms. This point is made by one chief executive thus: 
When you came before (in 1991), the council was hell bent on outsourcing everything, I think it 
was outsourced too much, nearly all our care, now we are building our own care homes, and we 
are trying to regulate the market price, because we outsourced absolutely everything, and then 
you’ve got the private sector completely in control of the pricing mechanism for all care. 
Here, local government is mirroring best practice from supply chain management, whereby 
organisations seek external partners to provide expertise in areas of activity and provide stability in 
operating environments (Christopher, 2005). Further, other benefits will also accrue for organisations 
seeking to develop a network stance vis a vis organisational positioning.  The ‘rules of the game’ 
which govern the participation of any organisation within a network can act as a behaviour moderating 
tool. As such Jarillo, again drawing upon supply chain management experience, noted: 
An emphasis on long term relationships is also essential to the development of trust, because it 
makes clear that the relationship itself is considered valuable. Therefore opportunistic behaviour, 
which could cause a severance of the relationship, will be considered less likely. (1988, p.37) 
Alongside the formalised partnership arrangements identified above, there exists a raft of informal 
arrangements whereby local organisations with mutual areas of interest will seek to develop 
relationships with other bodies. Hence, the idea of the local government manager as a ‘networker’ or 
‘boundary spanner’ (Williams, 2002) has emerged over recent years. Such relationships exist outside 
formal ‘business’ frameworks and relationships, and often depend for their existence and development 
on personality and mutual respect rather than power.  
Hence, in examining the networking arenas within the two London boroughs, it was found that in L1, 
the Mayor who, has been a leading light in the activities of the authority for twenty years, is the 
consummate professional networker. In L2, however, the abilities of Leaders present different 
pictures. The Leader in the 1980s adopted a confrontational style, one not conducive to networking. 
This can be contrasted with the Leader in 2005 who was seen nationally as a leading player in local 
government, and locally as being instrumental in bringing strategic partners together on a number of 
issues, whilst providing the authority with an ‘acceptable’ national face. 
Local government now has to conform to an impressive external inspection regime. The inspection 
environment can best be divided into two groupings: voluntary peer review and statutory review − 
with the former being less formal than the latter. The lynchpin to the formal inspection regime was the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA), published each year which ranks authorities 
according to a range of criteria, and awards a star rating accordingly – with four stars being the highest 
accolade. The rationale behind the CPA at the time of its introduction was that authorities judged to be 
‘excellent’ would enjoy greater freedoms to innovate, raise and spend money and be inspected less.  
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There was however some dissatisfaction that these freedoms had not materialised, and that alongside 
the retention of ‘capping’ powers, local government was still paying for the extreme actions of a small 
number of deviant councils. There was further dissatisfaction that the formal inspection regimes did 
not appear to be fully joined up. An example emerged from one authority of a seventeen-person 
inspection team to review a service area with a budget of £400,000, whilst the full blown CPA 
inspection team contained four members to examine corporate expenditure in excess of £300m.  
Within one of the sample authorities which had been hailed as a flagship authority during the 
Conservative era of Prime Ministers' Thatcher and Major, there was a feeling that the incoming 
Labour Government may have been harsher on it than on other local authorities, purely on political 
grounds. Indeed, it was suggested that with the election of New Labour in 1997, the authority had been 
‘cast into the political wilderness’. However, the CPA scores for the authority, which consistently 
rated it as ‘excellent’, allayed these fears. 
There was nevertheless the feeling amongst the interviewees that the peer review processes provided 
an informal sounding board to ascertain ‘where authorities are’ and were useful ‘mock’ examinations 
prior to formal statutory reviews. Indeed one chief executive was seeking to ensure that all chief 
officers and elected members participated in at least one peer review each year. This, it was argued, 
would allow the authority to share its experience as an ‘excellent’ rated council with others, as well as 
seeking out best practice elsewhere to adopt and apply within their own organisation.  
At the time of the 2005 interviews, one authority, L2 was preparing to have an Improvement and 
Development Agency peer review. The authority had successfully argued that the standard review 
mechanism was inappropriate for its circumstances. The authority had successfully argued that rather 
than been reviewed against other English authorities, its peers were in fact international local 
authorities, and that as such it should have a review panel which reflected this. Hence, in addition to 
the English peer reviewers, the inspection team contained a UK based local government chief 
executive with international local authority experience, and the mayor of a major US city.  
Given the status and nature of the local authority, it was argued that only by having such  a review 
could an accurate picture of where it stood alongside its peers be gained. Interestingly, whilst the 
‘standard’ review ran from Monday to Friday, L2 insisted that its population swelled during the 
weekend, only by being under review over the weekend could the reviewers gain a feeling for the 
managerial tasks faced by the organisation. This emphasis on the importance of managing over the 
weekend is in stark contrast to the evidence which emerged from the interviews in the early 1990s 
when it was the accepted view that chief officers and senior elected members would often retire to the 
country for the weekend. 
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Conclusion 
From the interviews conducted in 2005, it was apparent was that local government was enjoying 
something of a renaissance. Local authorities were no longer explicitly seen as the collective whipping 
boy of central government held up as examples of public sector inefficiency. Whilst the evidence does 
not present a uniform picture of acceptance of the reforms post 1997, it was clear that local 
government can no longer be viewed as being ‘under siege’. Rather, where reform was not uniformly 
welcomed, the resistance was far less hostile than that evidenced towards the local governance agenda 
of the Thatcher/Major years. 
The opportunities afforded by central government have been seized by local authorities. Whereas the 
picture offered by Asquith in 1997 of a range of differing positions vis a vis local authority 
organisational development, the 2005 evidence points towards a less diverse picture. The emphasis on 
internal managerial and political efficiency and probity, combined with the need to pursue a wider 
strategic governance role, have combined to push all six authorities revisited towards the 
'Entrepreneurial Citizenship' model. This has resulted in authorities pursuing the legislated agenda 
alongside a number of innovations which are specific to their locality - such as local partnership 
arrangements or democratic modernisation.  
Whereas in the early 1990s innovation could be said to have been the domain of the two London 
boroughs, all six of those interviewed in 2005 indicated that their respective authorities shared a desire 
to drive the change agenda forward to both strengthen local services and the position of local 
democracy. What did remain constant, was the desire of the two London boroughs to continually set 
the pace and direction of change for local government as a whole. Given the success of a number of 
innovations to enhance the democratic process in L1, it will be interesting to see if central government 
seeks to replicate these successes elsewhere in England in the Localism agenda being pursued by the 
Conservative/Liberal coalition elected in 2010. Certainly early evidence regarding the increased 
uptake of the Directly Elected Mayor in the major urban areas has been far from a resounding success. 
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